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A Summary 
Service plans are a type of warranty contract under 
which retailers promise to repair or replace products 
for consumers. Separate from manufacturers' 
warranty policies, which typically come bundled 
with the products, and also known as service 
contracts, protection plans, or retailer extended 
warranties, retailers' service plans are optional and 
usually offer broader and more prolonged coverage 
than those offered by manufacturers' base warranties. 
Today, these plans are available for almost all durable 
goods in retail stores, and so pervasive that it is rare 
to find a major retailer in the U.S. that does not 
provide them. In fact, it has become the norm that, 
when purchasing a product, consumers are faced with 
warranties offered by multiple parties, typically the 
manufacturer base warranty that is bundled with the 
product and an optional retail service plan. 
It is well documented that manufacturers use 
warranties to protect consumers against product 
failure and to signal product quality. In this paper, we 
argue that these roles of the manufacturer's warranty 
can be affected by the offering of retail service plans. 
From the consumer's point of view, the retailer's 
service plan complements and can even substitute for 
the manufacturer's base warranty. Given that the 
retailer has already offered a more extended warranty, 
it seems obvious that the manufacturer should offer a 
minimal warranty so as to avoid free-riding on the 
part of the retailer. So why does manufacturer still 
offer a base warranty? More generally, what 
motivates manufacturers to offer a base warranty 
when service plans are available to consumers? What 
are the strategic interactions between the retail 
service plan and the manufacturer base warranty? 
How do these service plans affect the role of 
manufacturers' warranties and channel performance? 
Regardless of the prevalence of service plans in 
the retail sector, studies on these plans and their 
interactions with manufacturers' warranties are scarce. 
The present research strives to contribute to a better 
understanding of the role of the retail service plan in 
distribution channels in which the manufacturer also 
offers a (base) warranty. Our investigation starts with 
a context in which consumers are able to assess 
product quality--in this research, high quality refers 
to a high degree of reliability in product performance 
(or a low risk of product failure). It then addresses 
the more interesting scenario of consumers being 
unable to assess that quality. It is well accepted that 
when quality is unobservable to consumers, a high 
quality manufacturer has the incentive to use a 
warranty to signal quality (Spence 1977). Our 
research therefore specifically investigates the role of 
a retailer's service plan in the manufacturer's 
signaling strategy. To concentrate on the signaling 
issues involved in warranty strategy, we abstract 
from the consumer moral hazard problem by 
assuming that consumer action does not affect the 
quality or reliability of products. Consequently, the 
results of our analysis are most applicable to products 
that require little consumer maintenance and present 
little opportunity for consumer moral hazard. 
We consider a market in which a manufacturer 
markets a product through a retailer to a group of 
consumers. The product is subject to a certain 
probability of failure. The consumers are 
heterogeneous in their willingness to pay to avoid the 
incidence of product failure. In a model with 
complete information, we assume that the quality of 
the product is known by all parties in the market. The 
manufacturer determines whether to bundle the 
product with a base warranty, and sets a wholesale 
price accordingly. Based on the manufacturer's 
decisions, the retailer then sets a retail price for the 
product and a price for an optional service plan, if it 
is offered. Consumers then determine whether to 
purchase the product and the service plan. In such a 
context, offering an optional service plan can help 
the retailer to promote product demand, and segment 
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and better serve heterogeneous consumers. We show 
that when the retailer offers a service plan, the 
manufacturer offers its warranty only if it is more 
cost efficient than the retailer in providing a 
warranty. 
We then develop models with incomplete 
information where the probabilistic product failure 
rate, either high or low, is determined by nature and 
known only to the manufacturer and the retailer, not 
known to the consumers. In such cases, a high 
quality manufacturer will have the incentive to signal 
its quality. Intuition suggests that in the presence of a 
more extended retail service plan, a high quality 
manufacturer should reduce its warranty coverage to 
avoid free-riding on the part of the retailer (Lutz and 
Padmanabhan 1995). In addition, because consumers 
who are very concerned about product quality can 
opt for a service plan to obtain peace of mind, it 
appears that the presence of such a service plan 
should also reduce consumers' need for a signal from 
the manufacturer, thus reducing that manufacturer's 
incentive to signal. Indeed, we find that the presence 
of a service plan can nullify the effects of a 
manufacturer's offering of a (longer or greater) base 
warranty as a signaling strategy, i.e., the availability 
of service plans can diminish the positive 
relationship between warranty and quality, as 
suggested by the signaling rationale of warranty. 
However, we also find that, in the presence of a 
service plan, a high quality manufacturer may have 
greater incentive to signal and offer greater warranty 
coverage in the signaling equilibrium. It is even 
possible that the greater the coverage of the service 
plan, the greater the incentive the manufacturer has 
to signal and the greater base warranty coverage it 
offers. These unexpected results highlight two 
opposing effects of a service plan on a manufacturer's 
incentive to signal quality by offering a warranty. 
Because, from the consumer's point of view, a service 
plan can substitute for the manufacturer's warranty, 
the availability of such a plan makes the presence of 
a manufacturer warranty less attractive. This 
mitigates the manufacturer's motivation to use a 
warranty to signal quality. At the same time, however, 
because a service plan can promote demand for a 
product, it can also enhance the manufacturer's 
motivation for such signaling. Therefore, when 
consumers are unable to access product quality, the 
impact of a service plan on the manufacturer's 
warranty strategy depends on these two opposing 
effects. 
The presence of a service plan also affects the 
profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer. We 
find that whether or not consumers are able to assess 
product quality, offering a service plan always 
increases profits for the retailer, but not necessarily 
for the manufacturer. The retailer cannot be rendered 
worse off by the acquisition of an additional 
marketing instrument, whereas the manufacturer will 
be better off only if the retailer's cost for providing 
the service plan is low enough.  
 
Literature Review 
There is a rich body of literature on product 
warranties. The insurance role of warranties was 
understood fairly early on and documented by Heal 
(1977). In this view, warranties provide insurance 
against product failure to risk-averse consumers. 
Because consumers have heterogeneous preferences 
for warranty coverage, the literature also shows that a 
seller can use a menu of warranty coverage to screen 
(i.e., to segment) consumers (Mussa and Rosen 1978). 
For instance, an optimal policy may consist of two 
warranty options, with a base warranty being offered 
to less risk-averse consumers and an extended 
warranty to more risk-averse consumers. When 
consumers' actions are unobservable but affect 
product liability, it has been shown that the consumer 
moral hazard problem can affect a firm's warranty 
strategy for screening (Padmanabhan and Rao 1993). 
Spence (1977) initiated a new branch of 
research on the signaling role of warranty. In markets 
in which product quality is not readily observable to 
consumers, a high quality manufacturer can use a 
better or longer warranty to signal its quality if it is 
too costly for a low quality manufacturer to offer the 
same coverage. Soberman (2003) considers a 
situation in which a seller uses a warranty both to 
screen and to signal, and shows that signaling can 
limit the seller's ability to screen because, to signal, it 
generally lengthens the base warranty and shortens 
the optional extended warranty. Lutz (1989) 
examines the use of prices and warranties as signals 
of product quality under consumer moral hazard and 
shows that, surprisingly, quality can be signaled with 
a low-coverage warranty. Although firms should take 
the consumer moral hazard problem into account 
when making warranty policy for certain products, 
we focus on other products that present little 
opportunity for the problem to highlight the signaling 
role played by the manufacturer's warranty. 
Provided that high quality products are less 
expensive to guarantee than low-quality products, it 
seems intuitively reasonable that an observable 
warranty could serve as a signal of unobservable 
product quality. It has been verified that a warranty 
can influence consumers' risk perceptions (Bearden 
and Shimp 1982). However, although some 
researchers have evidenced better and longer 
warranties as signals of high product quality (Wiener 
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1985, Kelley 1988, Boulding and Kirmani 1993), 
others have found lower quality products to offer 
longer warranties (Bryant and Gerner 1978, Gerner 
and Bryant 1981). A number of models have been 
proposed to address this inconsistency. Gal-Or (1989) 
showed that oligopolistic competition in a product 
market could affect firms' incentives, such that higher 
quality would be signalled by a lower warranty 
coverage. Balachander (2001) shows that a less 
reliable product may carry a longer warranty in a 
product market in which a new entrant competes with 
an established product. More researchers have argued 
that in the presence of consumer moral hazard, 
high-quality firms may optimally choose to offer less 
warranty coverage than low-quality ones because a 
strong warranty results in a low degree of 
maintenance effort on the part of consumers (Cooper 
and Ross 1985, Lutz 1989, Dybvig and Lutz 1993). 
Our results contribute to this stream of research by 
offering an alternative explanation for the weak 
relationship between quality and warranty: the 
presence of retailer service plans can diminish the 
correlation between them. 
The role of warranty has also been studied in the 
context of the supply chain, with a focus on channel 
coordination. Desai and Padmanabhan (2004) show 
that a manufacturer can use its warranty to coordinate 
a bilateral-monopoly distribution channel. In their 
model, the manufacturer warranty can be offered 
through three channel arrangements, direct (i.e., 
selling though the manufacturer itself), indirect (i.e., 
selling through a retailer) and dual distribution (i.e., 
selling through a combination of the aforementioned 
two). They find that the ability of a manufacturer to 
market a complementary good (i.e., a warranty) that 
helps to combat the price coordination problem in a 
channel alleviates its need to consider forward 
integration as a means of combating double 
marginalization. In an unpublished paper, Li et al. 
(2008) examine the role of warranty in a 
bilateral-monopoly distribution framework, but they 
assume that the warranty is offered by either the 
manufacturer or the retailer (but not by both). With 
reduced-form demand functions, they show that 
when the warranty is offered by the retailer, it has 
longer coverage and the system profit is greater. 
In all of the aforementioned, the warranty 
option(s) is assumed to be offered by one firm only. 
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies are 
exceptional in this regard, those carried out by Lutz 
and Padmanabhan (1995, 1998). 
In the context of consumer moral hazard, Lutz 
and Padmanabhan (1995) provide an explanation for 
the minimal manufacturer base warranties observed 
in certain markets. They show that the provision of 
an extended warranty by an independent insurer and 
the presence of consumer moral hazard create a 
negative cost externality on the manufacturer's 
warranty. To avoid the insurer free-riding on its own 
warranty, the manufacturer bundles its product with a 
minimal base warranty. Under conditions of producer 
moral hazard, these researchers (Lutz and 
Padmanabhan 1998) also focus on a manufacturer's 
ability to use a menu of warranties to segment 
consumers. They show that the availability of 
extended warranties from an independent insurer has 
an important effect on a menu of warranties to screen, 
and that the entry of the insurer can, surprisingly, 
increase the manufacturer's profits. 
The present research is among the few 
theoretical studies to explicitly model the interactions 
between warranties offered by different firms. 
Moreover, it is the first study on warranty in a 
distribution channel context in which both the up- 
and down-stream parties offer a warranty, and it is 
the first attempt to examine the interactions between 
warranties from a signaling perspective. We offer a 
number of insights that have not been addressed in 
the previous literature. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Service plans are a type of optional warranty beyond 
the manufacturer's base warranty that retailers offer 
to consumers. Regardless of their prevalence and 
nontrivial implications in distribution channels, 
research on service plans is scarce. In this paper, we 
examine the impacts of a retailer's service plan on a 
manufacturer's base warranty policy and on channel 
performance. Analysis shows that when consumers 
can assess product quality, in the presence of a 
service plan, a manufacturer should not offer a base 
warranty unless it is more cost efficient than the 
retailer in providing that warranty. When consumers 
cannot assess product quality, a high quality 
manufacturer is motivated to use its own warranty to 
signal that quality. In such cases, we find that, in the 
presence of a service plan, the manufacturer's base 
warranty serves as a credible signal only when the 
manufacturer is less cost efficient. The service plan 
can render the manufacturer's signaling either more 
or less viable, and result in either greater or lesser 
warranty coverage in the signaling equilibrium. 
Whether or not consumers can assess product quality, 
offering a service plan always increases profits for 
the retailer and the channel as a whole, but not 
necessarily for the manufacturer. 
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